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The current evidence-base regarding the impacts of corruption on firm performance is based largely 
on studies of individual countries and contains mixed results. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
achieve a better insight into this relationship by reporting the results of a firm-level analysis of the 
impacts of corruption on firm performance using World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data 
across 40 African countries. The clear result is that corruption significantly enhances rather than 
harms annual sales, employment and productivity growth rates. The outcome is to re-theorize 
participation in acts of corruption as beneficial for the individual firms engaged in such activity, 
while recognizing the wider evidence that this is not an optimal strategy at the aggregate country 
level. The outcome will be to advance knowledge about how corruption needs to be tackled. To 
eliminate corruption, it is shown here to be necessary for public authorities to recognize that 
corruption is an efficient strategy at the firm level and to adopt measures to alter the cost/benefit 
ratio confronting individual enterprises, and at the same time, to address the country-level formal 
institutional deficiencies that characterize many developing countries and result in the prevalence of 
corruption.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; corruption; bribery; firm performance; institutional theory; 
development economics; Africa. 
1.   Introduction  
Corruption is widely recognized as an enduring and extensive phenomenon not only in 
the developing world but well beyond (Aidis and Van Praag, 2007; Aliyev, 2015; Khan 
and Quaddus, 2015; Osipian, 2012; Round et al., 2008; Svensson, 2003; Tonoyan et al., 
2010). The GRPLQDQW³PRUDO´YLHZWKDW WKLV LVDQHJDWLYHSKHQRPHQRQ that needs to be 
eliminated is widely accepted and finds support in a multitude of studies, which reveal 
that the higher the level of corruption in countries, the lower is the level of economic 
development and growth (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Baumol, 1990; Méndez and 
Sepúlveda, 2006; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Until now, however, fewer studies have 
evaluated its firm-level impacts. The studies to have done so, mostly in individual 
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countries, reveal mixed results, with some revealing that engaging in acts of corruption 
boosts firm performance and others that it harms performance (Athanasouli et al., 2012; 
De Rosa et al., 2010; Donadelli et al., 2014; Dutta and Sobel, 2016; Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007; Gaviria, 2002; Kauffmann and Wei, 2000; Teal and McArthur, 2002; 
Williams et al., 2016a, b). To start to provide a better insight into this relationship 
between corruption and firm performance, the aim of this paper is to provide a more 
comprehensive cross-national analysis at the firm-level of whether engaging in corruption 
to get things done has an impact on firm performance and if so, whether it has a harmful 
or beneficial impact.  
Therefore, to advance understanding of the impacts of corruption on firm 
performance, section 2 commences by re-reading corruption through the lens of 
institutional theory as resulting from formal institutional imperfections and then reviews 
ERWK WKH GRPLQDQW ³PRUDO´ WKHRULzation, which portrays corruption as having negative 
impacts on firm performance, DV ZHOO DV WKH FRPSHWLQJ ³JUHDVLQJ WKH ZKHHOV´
theorization, which views corruption as having positive impacts on firm performance. 
Revealing the mixed results of existing studies in individual nations and sub-regions, and 
the lack of comprehensive assessments of the relationship between corruption and firm 
performance, the third section then outlines the dataset here used, namely World Bank 
Enterprise Survey data collected in 40 out of 54 African countries, and the econometric 
framework adopted. The fourth section then reports the findings. This will reveal there is 
a positive significant relationship between corruption and firm performance; corruption 
enhances rather than harms annual sales, employment and productivity growth rates 
across these 40 African countries. The fifth and final section then explores the theoretical 
and policy implications. This will re-theorize participation in acts of corruption as 
beneficial for the individual firms engaged in such activity while recognizing this may 
not be an optimal strategy at the aggregate country level. Corruption is not seen to hinder 
performance at the firm level but nevertheless to do so at the country level. Therefore, to 
eliminate corruption, it will be necessary for public authorities to recognize this and adopt 
measures to alter the cost/benefit ratio confronting individual enterprises as well as the 
country-level formal institutional deficiencies that result in the prevalence of corruption.   
However, before commencing this analysis corruption needs to be defined. 
Corruption here refers to WKH³PLVXVHRISXEOLFRIILFHIRUSULYDWHJDLQ´%DUGKDQ, 1997; 
Pope, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Svensson, 2005). This commonly used and 
accepted definition is appropriate here given the focus of this paper on the practice 
whereby government officials demand or receive gifts, bribes and other payments (e.g., a 
portion of a given contract) from private sector firms and provide a service in return. This 
might include speeding up the granting of an operating license, not producing a negative 
outcome from a workplace inspection, or helping them avoid delays in some other 
regulatory process requiring the approval of public sector officials such as the granting of 
a construction permit. However, it should be noted that although such low-level public 
sector corruption involving the payment of relatively small amounts by firms to public 
officials is the focus of both this paper as well as the vast majority of the literature on 
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corruption, other forms of corruption exist that have been less studied. These include 
state capture, whereby firms influence the formulation of laws and other government 
policies to their own advantage through illicit or non-transparent means (Fries et al., 
2003), and corruption where consumers use payments and connections to gain 
preferential access to public goods and services and/or to circumvent formal procedures, 
including the gaining of access to educational and health services (Williams and 
Onoshchenko, 2014a, b, 2015).  
2.   Corruption and Firm Performance: Competing Perspectives 
Considerable advances have been made in explaining corruption in developing countries 
in recent years by scholars adopting the lens of institutional theory. From this 
institutionalist perspective, LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH ³WKH rules of the game,´ ZKLFK SUHVFULEH
monitor, enforce and support what is socially acceptable (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; 
Denzau and North, 1994; Mathias et al., 2014; North, 1990; Webb et al., 2009). All 
societies have codified laws and regulations (i.e. formal institutions) that define the legal 
rules of the game (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North, 1994; Mathias et al., 
2014; North, 1990; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, b, c; Williams et al., 2015, 2016c). 
However, all societies also have informal institutions, which can be defined as the 
³socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced 
outside of officially sanctioned channels´ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Although 
corruption is illegal in terms of the formal institutions, in many developing economies, 
because of formal institutional imperfections, the circumvention of burdensome 
administrative requirements by making payments to public officials is often deemed 
acceptable and a socially legitimate activity (De Soto, 1989; Williams and Shahid, 2016; 
Williams et al., 2016b, c).  
Therefore, from this institutional perspective, corruption is a by-product of formal 
institutional imperfections, which leads to an asymmetry arising between formal and 
informal institutions. Two main types of formal institutional imperfection result in the 
prevalence of corruption. On the one hand, there are formal institutional inefficiencies, or 
resource misallocations by formal institutions (Qian and Strahan, 2007), such as when 
formal institutions seek to protect or maximize economic rents for elites (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012), resulting in overly burdensome taxes, registration and licensing 
regulations and costs, which act as an entry barrier for new entrepreneurs (De Soto, 
1989). On the other hand, there is formal institutional weakness and instability, 
manifested in a lack of capacity to enforce policies (Webb et al., 2009), poor public 
sector pay and continuous alterations in laws and regulations (Levitsky and Murillo, 
2009; Williams and Vorley, 2015). Indeed, the reason corruption is often found to be 
greater in developing countries, which by definition are countries that are developing 
their formal institutions, is because the deficiencies of formal institutions are greater 
(Williams et al., 2016b).  
However, to explain corruption, it is not only the role and quality of formal 
institutions that needs to be considered. These formal institutional failings lead to 
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incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by formal and informal institutions, 
resulting in entrepreneurs drawing upon existing norms, values and beliefs to govern and 
structure their behavior instead of relying on formal codified laws and regulations. These 
then become the basis for collective shared rules, whether implicitly held or formally 
codified (London et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2012). The result is that engaging in informal 
payments to corrupt public officials becomes viewed as socially legitimate even if 
formally illegal (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2016; Williams et al., 2016a). Therefore, 
the greater prevalence of corruption in developing economies than developed economies 
is because of the greater formal institutional deficiencies that lead to incongruence 
between formal and informal institutions (Mair et al., 2012).  
Therefore, what are the impacts on firms of engaging in such corrupt practices? Until 
now, two contrasting perspectives have been adopted. Here, each is reviewed in turn.  
2.1.   &RUUXSWLRQµVDQGV¶WKHZKHHOs of commerce  
A number of macro-level and cross-country studies have shown that corruption is 
detrimental to economic growth, such as by measuring its impact on growth through 
transmission mechanisms including private and public investment as well as military 
spending (d'Agostinoa et al., 2016; Asiedu and Freeman, 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikumana, 2007; Ndikumana, 2007; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). 
It is similarly the case that numerous country-level studies provide evidence at the macro-
level that countries with a high level of corruption display relatively lower levels of firm 
performance (Faruq and Webb, 2013; Mauro, 1995; De Rosa et al., 2010; Gaviria, 2002; 
Lavallée and Roubaud, 2011; Teal and McArthur, 2002). As Myrdal (1968) explains, 
corrupt civil servants cause delays that would not otherwise occur simply to provide 
themselves with the opportunity to receive a corrupt payment to speed up the process.  
Until now, however, the firm-level evidence that corruption harms firm performance 
has been limited to a small number of studies of single countries or sub-regions. Teal and 
McArthur (2002) find that African firms engaging in payments to corrupt public officials 
have twenty percent lower levels of output per worker. Fisman and Svensson (2007) 
similarly find that a one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a 
reduction in firm growth of three percentage points. Again in the African context, Faruq 
and Webb (2013) find that less productive firms are more likely to engage in payments to 
corrupt public officials and that corruption reduces firm productivity. There are similar 
findings from other parts of the developing and developed world. For instance, 
Athanasouli et al. (2012) in Greece, using firm level data, reveal that corruption is 
negatively associated with sales growth, while Gaviria (2002) finds that engaging in 
payments to corrupt public officials substantially reduces sales growth in Latin America. 
To evaluate this view that corruption harms firm performance, the following proposition 
can be tested: 
H1: Corruption sands the wheels of commerce: enterprises viewing it as necessary for 
enterprises like theirs to give gifts or payments to public officials to get things done 
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display lower levels of firm performance, after controlling for the endogeneity of 
corruption and other key determinants of firm performance. 
2.2.   &RUUXSWLRQµJUHDVHV¶WKHZKHHOVRIFRPPHUFH 
An alternative perspective is that corruption enhances rather than harms firm 
performance. This is consistent ZLWK WKH ³HIILFLHQW JUHDVH WKHVLV´ (Kaufmann and Wei, 
1999; Mawuli and Stinchfield, 2013) in which corruption is argued to reduce the heavy 
bureaucratic burden and resultant long delays in environments with formal institutional 
imperfections. Such payments firms give to public officials in return for services help 
them navigate the market failures induced by the failings of formal institutions. 
Therefore, at a country-level corruption is seen to boost economic development 
(Huntington, 1968; Jian and Nie, 2014; Leff, 1964). ³*rease´ money circumvents the 
distortions caused by an inefficient bureaucracy (Wei, 1998) and at a firm-level helps 
businesses overcome not only bureaucratic barriers to growth but also for nascent 
entrepreneurs, their liabilities of ³newness´ or ³smallness´ (Stinchcombe, 1965) by 
developing favorable relationships with public officials, which increases their legitimacy 
and decreases their likelihood of failure. Thus, such arguments share a presumption that 
corruption contributes positively to firm performance because it compensates for the 
consequences of an ineffective institutional framework and/or the weak rule of law 
(Webb et al., 2009).  
Most of the existing evidence on the positive association between corruption and firm 
performance covers a single country (Ayaydin and Hayaloglu, 2014; Delavalled, 2012; 
Vial and Hanoteau, 2010). Ayaydin and Hayaloglu (2014) analyze the relationship 
between firm growth and corruption in 41 manufacturing firms in Turkey, and find that 
making corrupt payments to public officials has a positive effect on firm growth, mainly 
EHFDXVHVXFKµVSHHGPRQH\¶HQDEOHVHQWHUSULVHVWRFLUFXPYHQWEXUHaucratic delays. Using 
panel data of Indonesian manufacturing firms, Vial and Hanoteau (2010) also find a 
positive relation between corruption and firm output and labor productivity. However, 
this is not always the case. Lavallée and Roubaud (2011) find no association between 
corruption and firm output and Fisman and Svensson (2007) find only a weak association 
with sales growth. 
Only three known cross-national studies analyze the firm-level impacts of corruption 
on firm performance. First, Blagojevic and Damijan (2012) examine data from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 27 transition 
countries for the period 2002-2009. They find that private firms (domestic and foreign 
owned) are more involved in making payments to corrupt public officials and that those 
firms making such payments have higher productivity growth, especially foreign-owned 
firms. Second, Williams et al. (2016a), in an analysis of 132 countries, find that bribery 
enhances firm performance with firms that pay public officials to get things done having 
13.9 percent and 48 percent higher average annual sales and productivity growth rates 
respectively. Finally, Méon and Weill (2010) used data from 69 developed and 
developing countries find supporting evidence for WKH³grease the wheels´K\SRWKHVLVin 
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contexts where institutions are ineffective. Based on these findings, therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
H2: Corruption greases the wheels of commerce hypothesis: enterprises viewing it as 
necessary for enterprises like theirs to give gifts or payments to public officials to get 
things done display higher levels of firm performance, after controlling for the 
endogeneity of corruption and other key determinants of firm performance.  
3.   Data and Methodology 
3.1.   Data and sample 
To evaluate the association between corruption and firm performance, evidence is 
reported here from World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected using a 
harmonized questionnaire and common methodology in 40 African countries surveyed 
between 2006 and 2013 (see Table 1). In each country, data is collected from a stratified 
random sample of formal private sector businesses with five or more employees, 
stratified by business sector, firm size and geographic region, covering 1200-1800 
business owners and top managers in larger countries, 360 in medium-sized countries and 
150 in smaller countries. Given that firm performance and other data was not collected on 
all firms, the result is a sample of 5,743, 7,520 and 5,608 surveyed firms associated with 
sales, employment and productivity performance indicators respectively. 
Table 1. List of 40 African Countries Surveyed 
Angola  Ethiopia Mozambique Togo 
Burundi Gabon Mauritania Tanzania 
Benin  Ghana Mauritius  Uganda 
Burkina Faso Guinea Malawi South Africa 
Botswana The Gambia Namibia DRC 
C. African Republic  Guinea-Bissau Niger Zambia  
&RWHG¶,YRLUH Kenya Nigeria Zimbabwe 
Cameroon Liberia Rwanda   
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Senegal  
Cape Verde Madagascar Sierra Leone  
Eritrea Mali Swaziland  
3.2.    Dependent variables 
To evaluate the association between corruption and firm performance, the dependent 
variables are three indicators of firm performance expressed in percentage terms. These 
are real annual sales growth rates (using GDP deflators); annual employment growth 
rates of permanent full-time workers and annual productivity growth rates. The 
productivity indicator is the annualized growth in labor productivity defined as real sales 
(using GDP deflators) divided by full-time permanent workers. All values for sales are 
converted to USD using exchange rates in the corresponding fiscal year of the survey. 
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3.3.   Key independent variable  
To evaluate the impact of corruption on firm performance, the answer given by 
entrepreneurs to the following question is examined ³,W LV VDLG WKDW HVWDEOLVKPHQWV DUH
sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to µget things 
done¶ with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services construction permits, 
etc. On average, what percentage of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do 
establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this 
SXUSRVH"´+HUHYDOXHVLJQLILHVHLWKHUQRSD\PHQWVRUJLIWVDUHSDLGZKLle value 1 is 
when they state a percentage share of a certain contract or total annual informal payment 
of any amount. Given the sensitive nature of the topic under investigation, the advantage 
of this question is that it asks enterprises about their payment to corrupt public officials in 
an indirect manner, enabling them to state that payments have been made without 
incriminating themselves or any public official(s) involved.  
3.4.   Control variables 
To measure the impact of corruption on firm performance, it is necessary to control for 
other key determinants of firm performance. Here, we include the following correlates: 
x Starting-up unregistered²registered firms are often viewed as more productive than 
unregistered firms (La Porta and Schleifer, 2014; Williams, 2013, 2015; Williams et al., 
E7RFDSWXUHWKHOLNHO\LPSDFWRIWKLVYDULDEOHZHXVHDGXPP\LQGLFDWLQJILUPV¶
registration status.  
x Firm age²this is widely believed to be an important determinant given the fact new 
ventures and young firms may lack legitimacy and under-perform relative to more 
established ventures (Ranger-Moore, 1997). In addition, long established firms are more 
likely to have access to some advantages such as access to bank finance mainly because 
of their relatively stronger contacts with officials (Fisman and Svensson, 2007).   
x Firm size²this is included to control for the conventional conjecture that larger 
firms perform better than smaller ones (La Porta and Schleifer, 2014).  
x Ownership structure and legal status²these are strongly associated with firm 
performance, including whether a firm is state- or privately-owned, foreign- or domestic-
owned and an open- or closed-shareholding, partnership or sole proprietorship (Barbera 
and Moores, 2013). Given that export-oriented firms are viewed as displaying higher 
levels of firm performance, a variable indicating export-orientation is also included. 
x Economic sector²firm performance varies across economic sectors (Siqueira et al., 
2014). In addition, because the incidence of corruption varies across sectors, it is 
necessary to control for sectoral differences. We controlled for fourteen sectors in our 
analysis, taking the textile sector as a reference category. 
x Access to credit²this is strongly correlated with firm performance and lack of 
access to credit is often considered one of the top constraints to firm growth and 
performance (Buyinza and Bbaale, 2013). 
x Level of technological innovation²this is also often closely associated with firm 
performance especially considering it can be the key driver of the productivity gap 
between firms as well as countries (Palmade, 2005). Here, three dummy variables capture 
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the presence of quality certification, a website and the use of e-mail to interact with 
clients and suppliers.  
x Human capital factors²firm performance is determined by educational level, the 
skills and experience of the owners, managers and the workforce, the level of 
professionalism and whether there is numerical flexibility in the workforce, impact on 
firm performance (Black and Lynch, 1996). We used six variables, namely: top 
PDQDJHU¶V \HDUVRI experience; the average number of temporary workers; the average 
number of permanent full-time workers; the share of permanent full-time workers that are 
female; female involvement in ownership and whether or not firms use an external 
DXGLWRUHJDQQXDOUHYLHZRIILUPV¶ILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWV. 
x Constraints²the data includes two important firm performance barriers in the form 
of transport and electricity constraints, both of which determine firm performance.  
In addition, unobserved heterogeneity across countries is controlled for by including 
time dummies. This enables us to capture any systematic pattern the countries might 
exhibit for the period under consideration; in particular, concerning any business cycle 
movements driven by prevailing macroeconomic conditions.  
3.5.   Analytical methods 
3.5.1.   Pooled OLS regression without controlling for endogeneity  
To evaluate the impact of corruption and other control variables on the performance of 
African firms, we apply a pooled OLS regression technique. Therefore, we adopt the 
equation: 
ijjnni Cxxy HEEEE  ....110   (3.1) 
 
where yi is the measure of firm performance (i.e., annual growth rates of sales, 
employment and productivity), Cj is a binary variable capturing incidence of corruption 
mediated through bribes and other informal payments as detailed in the ten corruption 
indicators discussed earlier (see more details below), the sx' capture other key drivers of 
firm performance (e.g. firm size, foreign ownership, human capital, credit availability, 
ILUPDJH«HWF.) and iH is the error term that follows a normal distribution with zero mean 
and constant variance. 
3.5.2.   Instrumental variables (IV) regression accounting for endogeneity  
The above OLS framework can generate baseline estimates but it potentially leads to 
biased predictions because of contamination of estimates by endogeneity, which makes 
the model unidentified. This is driven by the fact firms make a conscious decision to 
collude with corrupt officials rendering the corruption measure endogenous. Therefore, 
further refinement of the above specification through an instrumental variable (IV) 
equation needs to be considered (Bardhan, 1977). We implemented an IV regression 
model through two-stage least squares (2SLS). We also subject the resultant estimation to 
robustness checks by implementing the IV regression model through LIML (limited 
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information maximum likelihood) and GMM (generalized method of moments). For 
identification, two orthogonality conditions need to be satisfied, namely the instrument of 
choice should be correlated with the endogenous variable (i.e., corruption) and 
uncorrelated with the error term of equation (1) above. In the data we have two candidate 
variables that can serve as instruments. One is a variable that captures the state of trust by 
ILUPV 7KLV YDULDEOH LV UHODWHG WR ILUPV¶ EHOLHIs about the fairness, impartiality and 
uncorrupted nature of the court system. We argue that the trust firms have about the 
quality of institutions in a given economy affects their behavior and propensity to engage 
in corrupt practices (Williams et al., 2016b). Equally, their perception about trust is not 
necessarily and directly associated with firm performance. The second variable is the 
gender of the owner of firms. There is evidence supporting the risk-averse tendency of 
females compared to males (Black and Lynch, 1996). Relative to men, women are 
believed to be less likely to engage in risky behaviors such as bribing, giving gifts and 
other payments to get things done. The particular variable we focus upon here to use for 
instrumentation is the average percentage of female ownership of firms. Owners are not 
necessarily managers of firms who can directly influence firm performance indicators. 
+RZHYHU ZH DFNQRZOHGJH ZRPHQ¶V FULWLFDO UROH LQ PDNLQJ IXQGDPHQWDO GHFLVLRQs 
pertaining to firms they own that might affect firm performance. We believe these two 
instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions for identification and we verify this 
based on statistical tests of their validity. Among our instruments we have stronger 
priority on the trust variable than the female ownership variable. Therefore, we 
experimented with our specification with and without the female ownership variable in 
the instrument set. This did not change the final results that shape our key findings. 
4.   Results 
Examining the formal private sector businesses with five or more employees surveyed in 
the WBES across these 40 African countries between 2006 and 2013, 32.9 percent 
believe enterprises like theirs need to bribe public officials to get things done. This 
clearly displays the prevalence of informal payments in Africa. However, there are 
marked cross-national variations, ranging from 79.8 percent in the Republic of Congo 
through to less than one percent in Eritrea.  
To evaluate the association between corruption and firm performance, Table 2 reports 
the results of the pooled OLS regression model. The findings show a negative association 
between corruption and employment growth but a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with sales and productivity growth rates. As the coefficient in models 1 and 3 
display, annual sales and productivity growth rates are higher in enterprises viewing 
informal payments to public officials as necessary to get things done compared with 
those who do not. Therefore, this confirms hypothesis 2 that corruption enhances the firm 
performance measures of annual sales and productivity (i.e., sales per worker) growth 
rates. Thus, these baseline results intimate that corruption promotes sales growth for 
corruption-participating firms by limiting competition from non-corruption participating 
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firms and creates barriers to entry for firms operating in a legitimate manner (Djankov et 
al., 2002; Bliss and Di Tella, 1997).  
Table 2. Pooled OLS Regressions for the Impact of Corruption on Firm Performance in Africa 
 Model 1 
Sales Growth 
Model 2 
Employment 
growth 
Model 3 
Productivity 
growth 
Constant 16.07*** (4.10) 11.45*** (1.88) 38.95*** (4.72) 
Corruption 6.27***(1.49) -1.94***(0.68) 6.63***(1.54) 
Years spent unregistered 0.43*** (0.14) 0.15*** (0.06) 0.40*** (0.13) 
Firm age -0.24*** (0.04) -0.26*** (0.01) -0.08** (0.04) 
Exporter -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.02) 
Foreign ownership 2.21* (1.32) -0.21 (0.59) 2.55* (1.37) 
Workforce    
Top manager´s experience -0.02 (0.05) -0.08*** (0.02) 0.04(0.05) 
Temporary workers 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Permanent full-time workers 0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Female full-time workers -0.02 (0.02) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.02(0.02) 
Female participation ownership 0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Bank loan/credit -0.04*** (0.01) 0.01(0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) 
Major constraints    
Transport -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 
Electricity 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 
Innovation & technology    
Quality certification 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
External auditor -0.04*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) -0.03*** (0.01) 
Website -0.02** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00) -0.03*** (0.01) 
E-mail -0.013 (0.01) -0.01** (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) 
Firm size (R.C.: Small)    
Medium 2.16** (1.14) 2.04*** (0.50) 0.45 (1.18) 
Large 3.14 (2.20) -4.24*** (0.97) 0.27 (2.28) 
Legal status (R.C.: Open 
shareholding)  
 
 
Close shareholding -7.28** (2.92) -1.50 (1.19) -6.79** (3.05) 
Sole proprietorship -9.71*** (2.86) 0.69 (1.17) -11.16*** (2.99) 
Partnership -8.86*** (3.15) -0.08 (1.31) -9.62*** (3.28) 
Limited partnership -10.54*** (3.04) -3.51*** (1.21) -10.76*** (3.17) 
Other form -10.61** (4.38) 2.92 (1.89) -13.05*** (4.52) 
Sector dummies  YES  YES  YES  
Year dummies YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.14 0.08 0.11 
Model F test (P-value) 21.4(0.00) 15.03(0.00) 16.72(0.00) 
No of observations  5743 7520 5608 
Significant at p < 0.1*, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: WBES 2006-2014 data set. Own calculations. 
Meanwhile, model 2 displays that annual employment growth rates are lower in 
enterprises making corrupt payments compared with those who do not, and this 
difference is significant. When firms pay corrupt officials, it is an additional burden on 
them above and beyond their labor and non-labor costs. This burden is induced by the 
weak institutional situation under which firms are operating. Corruption can bring a 
deadweight loss that is detrimental to firm growth (e.g., through employment expansion), 
subsequently leading to a loss of welfare and social surplus. This is because informal 
payments firms make can act as an extra tax. Not only a decline in employment growth 
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but also an increase in prices to consumers might ensue because of the extra cost faced by 
firms. The negative impact of corruption on employment is also a critical indicator of its 
distortionary impact on resource allocation away from productive use. Enterprises 
viewing corruption of public officials as necessary to get things done can survive in the 
business but also damage the long-term investment vision of aspiring firms (both 
domestic and foreign) that are forced to exit because of the unofficial taxing burden of 
corruption and the uncertainty it generates. This in turn limits overall future long-term 
aggregate economic growth (De Rosa et al., 2010, Wei, 1997). However, and as will now 
be shown, this negative association no longer remains the case when we control for the 
endogeneity of corruption, indicating the dangers of making a spurious association by 
assuming the exogeneity of corruption. 
Table 3 below presents our preferred set of 2SLS results because they are produced 
after controlling for the endogeneity of corruption. When we run IV regression 
implemented through LIML and GMM, we obtain qualitatively similar results for the 
coefficients. The findings show a statistically significant positive association of 
corruption not only with higher annual sales and productivity growth rates but also 
annual employment growth rates in Africa. Hence, all the estimated equations render 
support to the prediction that corruption enhances firm performance, confirming 
hypothesis 2. It needs to be noted these associations are observed in a weak institutional 
setting. Corruption is a typical route for the prevalence of resource misallocation and 
inefficiency, which leads to the destruction of firms less able to pay kickbacks than 
others. Although beneficial to the individual firms to make such informal payments in 
terms of their firm performance, this is overall at the aggregate country level damaging to 
long-term investment and development because it is more likely to weaken the survival 
chances of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that act legitimately.  
We run a battery of tests to check the validity of our instruments (i.e., trust in 
institutions and female ownership of firms). According to the statistically significant p-
values of the Wu-Hausman, we reject the null (H0) hypothesis of the exogeneity of the 
instruments. Hence, this rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the corruption variable 
is endogenous. In addition, the F-statistics are greater than twenty, confirming that the 
instruments are jointly highly correlated with the respective firm level corruption. 
Finally, the test of our over-identifying restrictions, both the Sargan statistic (via 2SLS) 
as well as the Hansen J statistic (via GMM), fail to reject the null hypothesis of the 
validity of our instruments. This means the trust variable and the gender of the owner of 
the firm are valid instruments for corruption.  
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Table 3. 2SLSa Regression Estimates of the Effect of Corruption on Firm Performance in Africa 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Sales growth (%) Employment 
growth (%) 
Productivity growth 
(%) 
Coefficient (z-stat) Coefficient (z-stat) Coefficient (z-stat) 
Constant 5.524 (1.03) 6.893*** (3.02) 2.573 (0.48) 
Corruption 41.70 (2.79)*** 12.20 ((1.71)* 29.71** (2.03) 
Years Spent Unregistered 0.349** (2.40) 0.125* (1.94) 0.36** (2.45) 
Firm Age -0.22*** (5.18) -0.25*** (14.48) -0.07* (1.63) 
Exporter  -0.01 (0.53) -0.00 (0.31) -0.01 (0.66) 
Foreign Ownership 2.50* (1.79) -0.09 (0.15) 2.745* (1.95) 
Workforce    
7RS0DQDJHU¶V([SHULHQFH 0.00 (0.03) -0.07*** (2.97) 0.05 (0.97) 
Temporary Workers 0.01 (0.46) 0.01 (0.93) -0.00 (0.03) 
Permanent Full-time Workers 0.01(1.19) 0.01 (1.54) 0.01 (0.86) 
Female full-time workers 0.02 (0.72) -0.02* (1.95) 0.05** (2.15) 
Bank loan/credit -0.03*** (2.59) 0.01 (1.31) -0.03*** (2.92) 
Major constraints    
Transport -0.01 (0.40) -0.00 (0.63) 0.00 (0.10) 
Electricity -0.00 (0.21) -0.00 (0.21) 0.00 (0.03) 
Innovation and Technology     
Quality Certification 0.01 (0.83) 0.00 (0.18) 0.01 (1.05) 
External Auditor -0.03** (2.40) 0.00 (0.58) -0.03** (2.20) 
Website -0.02 (1.52) 0.02*** (3.90) -0.03** (2.45) 
E-mail 0.01 (0.44) -0.00 (0.44) 0.00 (0.32) 
Firm size(R.C.: small)    
Medium 1.92* (1.60) 1.93*** (3.76) 0.26 (0.21) 
Large 3.88** (1.67) 4.43*** (4.40) 0.74 (0.32) 
Legal status (R.C: Open 
shareholding) 
   
Closed Shareholding -8.88*** (2.86) -2.145* (1.70) -7.95** (2.52) 
Sole Partnership -11.38*** (3.77) 0.14 (0.11) -12.35*** (4.02) 
Partnership -7.84** (2.36) 0.41 (0.30) -9.13*** (2.71) 
Limited Partnership -11.40*** (3.57) -3.64***(2.93) -11.35*** (3.51) 
Other Form -12.01*** (2.60) 2.44 (1.25) -14.08*** (3.03) 
Sector Dummies YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.08 
Wu-Huasman  
(p-value) 
0.01 0.04 0.10 
Sargan statistic (p-value) 0.13 0.12 0.11 
F-stat 31.3 35.9 32.3 
Observations 5743 7520 5608 
N.B.: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant 
at 1%.  
5.   Discussion and Conclusions 
The finding that nearly one-third (32.9%) of enterprises surveyed in these 40 African 
countries believe it is necessary for enterprises like theirs to give gifts or payments to 
public officials to get things done indicates the prevalence of corruption across the 
                                                          
a
 There are also no qualitative changes to the results of the tests for the validity and relevance of our 
instruments. The Hansen J statistic following GMM yields the same conclusion about the validity of our 
identifying restrictions.  
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African continent at the firm level. Analyzing whether this enhances or reduces firm 
performance, the above analysis reveals that once other determinants of firm performance 
are taken into account and the endogeneity of corruption, participating firms have 
significantly higher average annual sales, employment and productivity growth rates. 
This confirms WKH ³JUHDVH WKH ZKHHOV´ RI FRPPHUFH hypothesis 2 that corruption 
enhances firm performance.  
The theoretical implication is that this paper advances knowledge by revealing that at 
the firm level, corruption is positively associated with firm performance. Participation in 
corrupt practices with public officials is thus a rational economic choice which benefits 
individual enterprises. From an institutional perspective, this is because in developing 
economies characterized by formal institutional deficiencies, engaging in corruption 
compensates for these deficiencies (e.g., inefficient public administration), but without 
compromising the legitimacy of entrepreneurs because this activity, although illegal in 
terms of the formal institutions, is deemed socially legitimate in terms of the norms, 
values and beliefs that comprise the informal institutions. Nevertheless, although 
engaging in corruption is an efficient strategy for individual firms in terms of enhancing 
firm performance, there is considerable evidence this is not an optimal and efficient 
strategy at the aggregate country level. A wealth of studies reveal that at the aggregate 
country level, corruption is harmful to economic growth and development (e.g., Méndez 
and Sepúlveda, 2006; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Therefore, what is an efficient and 
effective strategy for an individual enterprise is not an efficient and effective strategy at 
the aggregate country level. 
Examining the policy implications, there is thus a need to persist with efforts to 
eliminate corruption. However, the contribution to knowledge of this paper is that it 
reveals how the approach adopted by public authorities needs to recognize that making 
informal payments to corrupt public officials is a rational economic decision for 
individual entrepreneurs. Consequently, one option, drawing upon the classic utilitarian 
theory of crime, is to understand entrepreneurs as rational actors who evaluate the 
opportunities and risks confronting them and decide to make informal payments to 
corrupt officials if the expected penalty and probability of being caught is less than the 
benefits to be gained (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1968). To change this 
cost/benefit ratio so that not making payments to corrupt public officials is the rational 
choice, public authorities have two choices. On the one hand, the costs (i.e., the risks and 
sanctions) can be increased such as by increasing the probability of detection and the 
penalties for doing so. On the other hand, the benefits of not engaging in corruption can 
be improved. The problem in developing countries is that formal institutional 
imperfections hinder the ability of public authorities to implement such an approach. Not 
only are the benefits of being legitimate fewer than in developed countries but it is more 
difficult for public authorities to increase the risks of detection because of the weak 
formal institutions in existence. However, altering the costs and benefits confronting 
entrepreneurs is not the only way of reducing corruption.  
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In recent years, grounded in institutional theory, recognition has emerged that 
corruption directly results from formal institutional failings. The outcome is that 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶QRUPVYDOXHV and beliefs often differ to the codified laws and regulations 
(De Castro et al., 2014; Williams and Shahid, 2015). Therefore, public authorities should 
perhaps shift away from a punitive approach that seeks to improve the detection and 
increase the penalties for engaging in corruption. After all, this only deals with the 
effects, not the causes, of corruption. Instead, the formal institutional deficiencies that 
lead to the prevalence of corruption in the developing world need to be addressed. On the 
one hand, this requires measures to alter informal institutions (i.e., norms, values and 
beliefs) regarding the acceptability of corruption so the asymmetry between informal and 
formal institutions (and thus corruption) is reduced, such as by raising awareness through 
advertising campaigns about the costs of corruption. On the other hand, and perhaps more 
importantly, this re-alignment also requires alterations in formal institutions. Corruption 
has been shown to be a product of formal institutional deficiencies, including the salaries 
paid to public officials, and to decrease as the efficiency and quality of governance 
improves (Méon and Weill, 2010). To make progress in combating corruption, the 
regulatory or governance environment needs to improve significantly, as the 2016 
African Governance Report argues (ECA, 2016). Institutions should be designed in a 
manner that does not encourage rent-seeking tendencies from public officials (i.e., by 
being disorganized, discretionary and taxing firms time-wise) and with enforcement 
mechanisms that discourage opportunities for corruption. Corruption payments crowd out 
money that could have been allocated to productive investment initiatives and long-term 
growth by enterprises.  
However, these two policy approaches of changing the cost/benefit ratio confronting 
enterprises and tackling the formal institutional deficiencies are not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, there are at least two ways of combining them. First, a ³responsive regulation´ 
approach starts out by helping entrepreneurs self-regulate themselves in a manner 
consistent with the law by reducing formal institutional failings and pursuing campaigns 
to change entrepreneurs¶ norms, values and beliefs so they align with the laws and 
regulations. This facilitating of voluntary compliance is then followed by persuasion 
through incentives (e.g., enhancing the benefits of not engaging in corruption) and only 
as a last resort for the small minority still refusing to comply does it use punitive 
measures based on increasing the costs of corruption (Braithwaite, 2009; Job et al., 
2007). A second approach is the ³slippery slope framework´ (Kirchler et al., 2008), 
which pursues both voluntary and enforced compliance concurrently by developing both 
greater trust in authorities (e.g., by decreasing formal institutional deficiencies) and the 
greater power of authorities by increasing the penalties and risks of detection as well as 
the incentives to operate legitimately. Until now however, there has been little 
comparative evaluation of which sequencing and/or combination is the most effective 
means of reducing corruption in the developing world.  
In sum, if this paper encourages recognition that making informal payments to 
corrupt public officials is a rational economic choice for entrepreneurs that results in 
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higher firm performance in Africa, despite corruption having an overall detrimental 
negative impact at the country-level, then one intention of this paper will have been 
fulfilled, especially if this hypothesis is also now evaluated in other global regions. If this 
then results in public authorities recognizing the firm-level benefits and encourages them 
not only to pursue alterations in the cost-benefit ratio confronting individual firms but 
also the formal market deficiencies that lead to the non-alignment of entrepreneurs¶ 
norms, values and beliefs with the laws and regulations regarding corruption, then this 
paper will have fulfilled its wider intention. Indeed, unless what is beneficial for the 
individual entrepreneur and what is beneficial for the country is aligned, what is for 
certain is that progress will not be made toward eliminating corruption in these African 
countries or the wider developing world.   
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